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This paper is an adaptation of the Chamley-Gale endogenous-timing information-revelation
model of investment (Econometrica, 1994). The paper models a game with pure informational
externalities where agents can learn by observing others’ actions. Observational learning about
the value of the investment project can result in massive social imitation, possibly leading the
society to the incorrect choice, to an inefficient cascade. While Chamley and Gale characterize
the equilibrium of such a game, this paper yields an analytic approximation to the probability of
inefficient cascades and allows for  the derivation of comparative statics results. This is useful
for two reasons: i) these results indicate that some of the findings from the exogenous-timing
herding literature  may not necessarily be generalizable to the endogenous-timing framework. ii)
the study may be useful in the analysis of a wide variety of applied issues including IPO pricing,
speculative attacks and adoption of new technology.1Also see the “living “document by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1996) for an
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on herding.
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1. Introduction
People often observe other people’s actions while making their own decisions. This might be due
to positive social or network externalities and/or it might be due to social learning. This paper
focuses solely on observational learning without any externalities. When signals are private,
rational agents may be able to infer the nature of the state from the actions of their predecessors.
Herd behavior or information cascade occurs when everyone is imitating the crowd, even when
their private information suggests the opposite. In this social learning process, if early movers’
signals happen to be incorrect then agents may settle on a common inefficient action, resulting
in an inefficient cascade.  This paper adapts the endogenous-timing information-revelation
investment model of Chamley and Gale (1994) to study the factors that make inefficient cascades
more likely. 
In a survey study, Devenow and Welch (1996) give an extensive list of empirical
phenomena that informational cascades may explain
1. Examples come both from real markets
such as R&D investment decisions and from financial markets; among others, analysts’
recommendation of a particular stock, bank runs and managers decisions to pay dividends may
have elements of herding behavior. It is often argued that conformist behavior in financial and
real markets may lead to sudden booms and crashes. This paper studies the factors that influence
the likelihood of erroneous mass behavior, either when there is an investment boom even though
the true value of the project is low (inefficient positive cascade), or when there is an investment
collapse even though the true value is high (inefficient negative cascade).    
In seminal papers by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani and Hirshleifer and Welch
(1992) each person observes the behavior of the people who went before him where there is an
exogenously determined sequence in the moves. These models show that society may settle in
an inefficient outcome because valuable information gets trapped at some stage of social
learning. Chamley and Gale (1994) prove the existence of herd behavior even when the timing
of moves and information revelation is endogenous. In an endogenous-timing framework, the
individual agent has an incentive to wait in order to observe the actions of other players.
However if everyone were to wait, the agent would rather move early in order to avoid cost of
delay. Hence the timing decision is strategic. 2Zhang (1997) provides a endogenous timing framework where the first mover is the
agent with the highest precision of information. A cascade starts immediately after the first
mover, all  agents follow the expert leader. 
3This corresponds to Section 6 in Chamley and Gale. 
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While Chamley and Gale characterize the equilibrium of such a game, this paper yields
an analytic approximation to the probability of inefficient cascades and allows for  the derivation
of comparative statics results. 
To the best of my knowledge, in a framework where agents do not have preferential
access to information
2, this is the first endogenous-timing herding model that allows for the
derivation of comparative statics results for the probability of negative and positive information
cascades. The analysis will allow us to examine whether inefficient cascades are more or less
likely as signal quality improves, as the observation period length increases and  as there is more
to lose or gain. This is useful for two reasons: First, it allows a deeper understanding of the
relationship between exogenous and endogenous timing herding models. This paper shows that
some of the results on exogenous-timing herding models do not necessarily generalize to models
with endogenous timing. Secondly, the derivation of comparative static results in the Chamley-
Gale model provides a framework that may be useful in the analysis of a wide variety of applied
issues. Some of these will be discussed in the conclusion.
2. Framework 
Each of the identical risk neutral agents with  an investment option can exercise the option at any
date T=0,1,2,...4 of his choice. All options are identical and indivisible. The investment decision
is irreversible. * 0(0,1) is the common discount factor. Each player with an option chooses either
to invest now or delay. If the player never invests the payoff is 0.  Whether or not the player has
an option is private information. Only if the option is exercised information is revealed. The true






H with prior probability q*0(0,1).
  This paper adapts the r-Fold Replica Game of Chamley and Gale 
3.This implies that the
population is unboundedly large. While the population consists of  rN agents, only rn of them-3-
have an opportunity to undertake an investment project. The results will hold as r64. When the
project value is high, more people are aware of the investment opportunity and hence more




Chamley and Gale assume that the number of people with an option is stochastic but it
is more likely to be high when the true value of the project is high. However, here the value of
the project is either high or low and there is a one-to-one mapping between V and n. The
restriction to only two possible project values will allow us to summarize agents’ beliefs about
the true state of the nature at time T in a single variable: the probability that the project value is
high. This mapping will prove to be very convenient in eventually formulating the learning
process in a linear fashion.  So far this is a special case of Chamley and Gale.
Let us now introduce the changes to the Chamley and Gale framework. In Chamley and
Gale both orders and processing of orders happen in discrete time. Whereas here, agents will
place discrete-time state-contingent orders which get processed in continuous time. Players place
their orders at the beginning of each period.  Orders are processed randomly during the period
– the exact time that an individual order is processed is distributed uniformly in the period. Since
information on others’ actions will be arriving during the period, players are permitted to make
their orders (both invest and wait orders) contingent on the flow of information. Payoffs on all
orders processed in a period are received at the end of the period. The benefit of moving to
continuous-time order processing is that it will allow us to approximate a transformation of the
agent’s problem as a Wiener process with absorbing boundaries and hence derive the probability
of inefficient cascades.
Each invest order comes with a state-contingent wait order. The investment cannot be
reversed in case the invest order is already processed. During the interval [T,T+1), if the state-
contingent wait order is triggered, then at most M of the newly triggered wait orders are
processed, where M is a large but finite number. The number of newly triggered wait orders W
may exceed M. In that case, a randomly selected W-M of these newly triggered wait orders are
ignored. These are simply continued to be  processed as invest orders. One can interpret M as the4This approach cannot rule out the possibility that other equilibria may also exist.
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maximum capacity of the processing agency to accommodate  state-contingent orders. Each wait
order comes with a state-contingent invest order. During the interval [T, T+1), if the state of the
state-contingent invest order is triggered, then at most M of the newly triggered invest orders are
processes. If the number of the newly triggered invest orders Z is greater than M, then the
remaining Z-M are not processed during the period. As will be shown, this form of contingent
order will ensure that in equilibrium the expected payoffs from putting an invest or wait order
will be the same as the expected payoffs from putting in an invest or wait order in the Chamley
and Gale framework. 
3. Equilibrium
We will start out by conjecturing that the equilibrium of this new game mirrors the equilibrium
in the game of Chamley and Gale. Then it will be shown that in this conjectured equilibrium the
players’ expected payoffs from their equilibrium strategies and from possible deviations are the
same as those resulting to players in Chamley and Gale’s game. And hence Chamley and Gale’s
proof of equilibrium will apply here as well
4.
 Each player who receives an investment option faces a tradeoff between investing and
delaying. If the player invests now he collects the undiscounted payoff but faces the risk of
making a loss in case the true value is V
L. If the player delays he collects only discounted payoffs
but he can make use of information revealed by other players’ actions. If the agent knew how
many people had the investment option he would know V. Hence observing the number of people
who invest can help predict the true value of the project. The focus is only on the symmetric
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. Before describing the equilibrium strategies, let us first introduce
some critical values.
3.1. Critical Values 
The prior probability that V=V
H is q*. Denote qt as the subjective probability at time t that the true
value is high. Since orders are processed in continuous time, qt evolves in continuous time. The
index of time for discrete decision time nodes will be denoted by T.  While t0ú
+, the index 
. So, at discrete time nodes when t=T, qt=qT. At the beginning of the game, the probability5This implies that  . 
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that the project has a high value, qT at time T=0, conditional on having received an investment
opportunity, is given by: 
(2)b
Since  , (2) can be rewritten as,
(3)c
The game is of interest if initially the expected value of the project is positive. Otherwise each
agent would strictly prefer to wait and the game would end immediately with an investment
collapse
5.
It will be useful to introduce two critical values for the subjective probability. Define q _
as the probability where the expected value of the project is zero:
q _ V
H +(1- q _ ) V
L =0 (4)d
When qT<q _, the expected value of investment is negative. So the agent will strictly prefer to wait.
Since everyone who has not yet invested is identical they all prefer to wait and the game
effectively ends. Investment stops for good.
Define q
_
 as the probability where the agent is just indifferent between investing now and












The left hand side is the expected value from investing. The right hand side gives the expected
value from waiting given that the true value of the project is to be revealed. When qT>q
_
  the agent
will strictly prefer to invest now. And so will all identical players, and the game ends where all
players with an option invest. The game will be said to be active when q _<qT<q
_
. 6While intuitive, this argument assumes that is not optimal to wait for information that
may arrive several periods later. This is in fact the case. The optimal program will have a “one-
step property” where at any period the agent is willing to make a once and for all invest-not
invest decision. See Chamley and Gale proposition 3 for the proof.
-6-
3.2. Learning
The player’s actions depend on the publicly observed history of the game which is described by
the sequence of the number of people who invested during each period. Following the notation
in Chamley and Gale, for any history h, let  8(h) denote the probability that a player who has not
yet invested does so after observing the history h. In the active phase of the game, it must be that
0<8(h)<1. Assume for a moment that an agent expects all people with an investment opportunity
to invest this period. Then he would strictly prefer to wait to be able to learn the value of the
project for sure. But so would everyone else. Hence 8(h)1. If he expects nobody else to invest
this period, there would be no learning this period, so as long as expected value from investment
is positive he would strictly prefer to invest now.
6 But so would everyone else. Hence 8(h)0,
by contradiction. In equilibrium, 0<8(h)<1, such that players are just indifferent between waiting
and investing now. Notice that  8 is the endogenous information revelation parameter. If 8 were
zero, no information would be revealed. If 8 were equal to one, the number of people who invest
would fully reveal information about the value of the project. 
As r64, the number of people putting in invest orders at a decision node is given by the
Poisson approximation to the binomial distribution. The parameter of the Poisson distribution
is the mean number of invest orders, rn times 8=8(h). The probability that k players invest at a
decision node given 8 is: 
(6)f
Define  f 
H (k;8)/f(k;8) when n= n
H, and  f 
L(k;8)/ f(k;8) when n= n
L. If n
L were equal to n
H, then
R=1 and the two probability density functions would collapse together. In such an extreme case
the quality of the signal k would be nil and the signal would not reveal any information. However
as R decreases, the signal quality improves and an observation of the rate of investment provides
valuable information in distinguishing between f 
H(k;8) and f 
L(k;8).7See Proposition 8 and the proof in Chamley and Gale.
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Define kT as the number of invest orders put in at the decision node T-1. Assuming no
contingencies are triggered, kT is  total number of people who invest in the time interval [T-1,T)
and it  is public knowledge at decision node T. The history up to time T is hT. The 8 that makes
the agents indifferent between investing and waiting at the decision node T is 8T. Bayesian
learning suggests that at time T, when the agent observes kT people investing, the subjective
probability will evolve following:
(7)g
Chamley and Gale prove that in equilibrium 8 is independent of both r and the total
number of people who have already invested
7. The basic intuition is that the individuals’ learning
is equivalent to learning from sequence of samples. Since r64, the rate of investment is very
small compared to the size of the economy. Therefore one can think of the sampling simply as
sampling with replacement. The equilibrium 8 at the decision node T, will solely depend on
history captured by qT-1 and kT. In the active phase of the game, for each qT 0(q _ , q
_
), there will be
a critical 6=6(qT), such that qT+1 is just at or below q _. So the following equation implicitly defines
8T where the agent is just indifferent between investing now and waiting.
(8)h
The left hand side gives the expected payoff from investing now. The right hand side gives the
discounted expected payoff from waiting. The first term of the brackets is the probability of
observing a particular k at time T+1. The second term is the expected value of the project given
that the particular k is observed.
3.3. Equilibrium Strategies-8-
Let us first assume that the institutional setup restricts the agents to only use is q _ and q
_
 as their
triggers for the contingency orders. In Appendix C, this assumption is relaxed. The equilibrium
of the game with any finite set ' of possible contingency trigger points with cardinality greater
than one and which contains both  and  is shown to yield the same boundary crossing
probabilities as the baseline model.
 
PROPOSITION: Let 8T be described by Equation (8), the following equilibrium strategy supports
a symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:   
a) If subjective probability is sufficiently low qT #q _, put in a wait order with a state-contingent
invest order. If in the time interval [T,T+1), qt $q,
_
 the state-contingent invest order is triggered.
b) If subjective probability is sufficiently high,  qT $q
_
, put in an invest order with a state-
contingent wait order. If in the time interval [T,T+1), qt#q _, the state-contingent wait order is
triggered. 
c)If subjective probability is q _<qT<q
_
 , with probability 8T, put in an invest order with a stat-
contingent wait order. If in the time interval [T,T+1), qt#q _, the state-contingent wait order is
triggered. With probability (1-8T ) put in a wait order with a state-contingent invest order. If in
the time interval [T,T+1), qt$q
_
 the state-contingent invest order is triggered.
PROOF: a) By equation (4), when the subjective probability is q _, the expected value of the project
is just equal to zero. Hence the agent strictly prefers to wait when qT <q _. If in the time interval
[T,T+1), qt$q
_
 the expected value of the project would be so high that the agent would  prefer to
invest. Note that in this case, the contingency order will never be triggered in equilibrium. Once
qT #q _ all identical agents with an investment opportunity will prefer to wait. This becomes an
absorbing state and the investment ends for good. No new information can be received in the
time interval [T,T+1) to increase qt above q
_
. 
b) By equation (5), when the subjective probability is q
_
, the expected value of investing now is
just equal to waiting one more period assuming that information about the true value of the
project were to be reveal for sure next period. Hence, when qt$q
_
, the agent prefers to invest right
away. If in the time interval [T,T+1) new information were to arrive such that qt#q _ the agent
would prefer to wait. Notice that this is an absorbing state. When qt$q
_
 all agents with an
investment option would prefer to invest. Since r64, the rate of information flow would be a8Proposition 8 in Chamley and Gale. 
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continuous variable and the true value of rn and hence V, would be revealed at once. If V=V
H,
agents subjective probability would remain above q
_
. If V=V
L, the subjective probability would
immediately drop down below q _. All agents state contingent orders would be triggered at once
but only M of them would be able to stop the investment. The game would end with all investing
except for those lucky M people. 
c) If subjective probability is q _<qT<q
_
 , the expected value of investing is positive but the agent
will also consider waiting in order to learn about the true value of the project. In equilibrium the
agents is just indifferent between investing now and waiting. See the beginning of section 3.2 for
the discussion of the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibrium.
i) The agent with an investment option who has not yet exercised his option will put an invest
order at time T with probability 8T.  If however in the time interval [T,T+1), qt falls below q _, the
agent would prefer to wait. Once the contingency is triggered all unprocessed invest orders would
convert into wait orders. Since M is a very large number, investment would stop for good. 
ii) The agent with an investment option who has not yet exercised her option will put a wait order
at time T with probability (1-8T). If however in the time interval [T,T+1), qt rises above q
_
 the
agent would prefer to invest. In fact all agents would now prefer to invest all at once. M is very
large but finite, whereas r64. Hence M newly arrived invest orders would be processed this
period. All the rest would be processed next period. At time T, the agent realizes that the is an
infinitely small probability that his invest order would be processed if the state is triggered.
Hence equation (H) continues to define 8T.
The equilibrium strategies and the possible deviations of this game yield the same
payoffs as in Chamley and Gale.
 
4. Information Cascades
The subjective probability evolves as a result of observational learning from the rate of
investment each period, which is a stochastic variable. Chamley and Gale prove that eventually
the game will end with an information cascade
8. If the subjective probability hits q _ before q
_
, the
game ends with an investment collapse. If the subjective probability hits q
_
 before q _, the game
ends with an investment boom. We are particularly interested in the probability of inefficient-10-




H , and the probability that the process hits q
_
 before q _ when V= V
L . The first would be an
inefficient negative cascade and the latter would be an inefficient positive cascade.
4.1. Transformation 
In order to obtain the boundary crossing  probabilities, we will need to transform the problem
into an equivalent problem that is tractable. Subjective probabilities evolve following (7),
substitute f 
H(kT;8T-1) and f 
L(kT;8T-1) into (7). Cancel out kT  factorial from the numerator and
denominator. Take the inverse of both the left and right hand side of the equation and subtract
one from each side. Now plugging in R for  yields,
(9)k
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides yields:
(10)m
where kT  is distributed Poisson with the parameter 8T-1rn
H when the true value of the project is
high and it is distributed Poisson with the parameter 8T-1rn
L when the true value of the project is
low. For large 8rn, the Poisson distribution can be approximated by the normal distribution.
Notice that kT$0. However the normal distribution assigns positive probability to events with
kT<0. Hence this approximation is less than perfect for small 8rn. Define wT as:
  (11)p
Notice that wT is an increasing monotonic transformation of qT.  Plugging (p) into (m), we get a
transformed  problem:
(12)zh9See Luce (1986) for an introduction to this literature. MORE?
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where kT




H>0 by Appendix Claim A1. And :
L<0 by Appendix Claim A3.
Individual learning is a stochastic process with independent increments. This process is
a well known description of individual learning in cognitive psychology. In much of that
literature individuals are modeled as learning through random sampling with exogenously
determined “response thresholds.” This characterization of the learning process is used to explain
laboratory evidence on individual response times and error rates. The present paper shows that
even with fully rational agents group behavior will resemble individual behavior with boundedly
rational agents of the type used in cognitive psychology.
9
The transformation (p) of the lower bound given by (4), of the upper bound given by (5)
and of the starting point given by (3) yield :
The lower bound:  q _ Y w _  w _ =    (15)q
The upper bound: q
_
  Y w
_
   w
_
 =  (16)r
The starting point: q0 Y w0 w0 =  (17)s
Notice that for the game to be active, w _ <w0 since initially the expected value of the project is
positive (see footnote 5). And w0 <w
_
 examining (e) and (c) together.
4.2. Boundary Crossing Probabilities with constant 8
The individual learning process follows the equation (14) where the error term is distributed
approximately normal with mean : and variance F
2. Both the mean and the variance of the
process depend 8T and hence they depend on the history of the game. They are not constant.
Now we are going to examine a different process. In this modified problem, we will
examine the process described by equation (zh) and (zo) yet with a constant 80(0,1), implying10FOOTNOTE ?????
11See Karlin and Taylor (1975).
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a constant drift and variance. In section 4.3, we will prove that the process with the endogenously
determined 8T will yield identical boundary crossing probabilities as in the modified problem with
fixed 8.   
Note that orders are processed in continuous time and the processing time of each order
is distributed uniformly over the period [T,T+1).  So we can define wt as a continuous variable
which coincides with wT when t=T. Denote  as the stochastic term which is distributed normal
where : and F
2 (given by Equation (zo)) are respectively the drift velocity and the power of the
noise of the process. Assuming 8T-1= 8T., wt can be approximated by a Wiener process
10:
(Az)
 Equations (17), (15) and (16) give the starting point and the bounds. We can easily compute the
boundary crossing probabilities. 
i) Probability of hitting w _ before w
_
 when V=V
H and 8T-1= 8T: In this case, the drift is
positive, :
H>0. The probability of hitting w _ before w
_








H. Combining the six equations, one can find a closed form solution for the probability of
hitting the lower bound before the upper bound. Divide the numerator and the denominator of
(18) by  and plug in the values of   w _, w
_





where  . n<0 by Claim A1 in the Appendix. Notice that this probability is
independent of 8.-13-
ii) Probability of hitting w _ before w
_
 when V=V
L and 8T-1= 8T: In this case the drift is
negative, :









L. Combining these six equations, one can find a closed form solution for the probability of





where .  (>0  by Claim A3 in the Appendix.
4.3.  Inefficient Cascade Probabilities for the Original Problem
Proposition 1: The boundary crossing probabilities of the original problem are equal to the
boundary crossing probabilities found using a Wiener process, (19) and (21) of the modified
problem.
Proof: In the actual learning process the parameter 8 is updated via equation (8) at each 
As long as contingencies are not triggered 8 stays constant during the interval [T, T+1). The
boundary crossing probabilities for this process can be reconstructed iteratively using the Lemma
in Appendix C1.  Starting with the Wiener process with absorbing boundaries defined in (*), (**),
(15), (16) and (17), create a process where the parameter  changes to  (which is stochastic)
at t=1 and stays constant thereafter. From the lemma this new process has the same transition
probabilities as the original process. Since after t=1 the process is a Wiener process we can do
this again after one more period and the new process will also have the same transition
probabilities. Iterating this argument yields the result. ~-14-
5. Comparative Statics
Since we have approximated closed-form solutions for the probability of inefficient cascades we
can examine the comparative statics. We will start with the comparative statics that behave same
as in exogenous-timing models and then move on to the new comparative statics results we learn
from this endogenous-timing framework. 
5.1. The Prior:
As one would expect, increasing the ex-ante probability that V=V
H decreases the probability of
an inefficient negative cascade. 
(22)x
since n<0 and  .
The likelihood of getting into  into a positive cascade even though V=V
L , increases as the
prior goes up.
(23)y
since (>0 and . The prior probability q* can take the interpretation of reputation.
The comparative statics results indicate that the  better the  initial  reputation of the investment
project, the higher chances it will have to be undertaken by masses even when the true value of
the project is low.  
5.2. Project Value:
In an exogenous-timing herding framework Welch (1992) shows that as the expected value from
investment goes up, early movers are more likely to invest. Hence the is a higher change that the
society ends up with a positive cascade. In our endogenous-timing framework, we get the similar
comparative statics for different reasons. If there is more to gain from successful investment, the
probability of inefficient negative cascade goes down.
(24)ze-15-
and likewise if there is less to lose from investing the probability of an inefficient negative
cascade goes down.
(25)zf
         
There are three forces. When the expected value of the project goes up either due to an increase
in V
H or V
L, the agent is more inclined to move now rather than delay. Hence the equilibrium rate
of information flow goes up, making the agent just indifferent between waiting and not. With a
higher information flow it becomes less likely to fall into a negative cascade since the true value
is high (a stronger :
H due to a higher 8). However as the information flow goes up, so does the
power of the noise of the learning process. The noise makes it more likely to fall into a negative
cascade when V=V
H. These two forces exactly cancel each other out since 8 cancels out from the
probability of inefficient negative cascade. Meanwhile as the expected value of the project goes
up, the upper bound q
_
 and the lower bound q _ both decrease, see equations (5) and (4), while the
starting point is unchanged. Therefore the probability of hitting the lower bound before hitting
the upper bound decreases, making an inefficient negative cascade less likely.
When the expected value of the project goes up, either due to an increase in V
H or in V
L,




As the expected value of the project goes up, both the lower bound and the upper bounds goes
down. The probability of hitting the lower bound before hitting the upper bound decreases,
making an inefficient positive cascade more likely. 
5.3. Discounting:
Discounting doesn’t play a role in exogenous timing models. Examination of this issue requires
an endogenous timing model. To my knowledge, This is the first endogenous-timing paper with-16-
comparative statics results on discounting. The agent makes a choice between investing now or
later. If the agent waits, he can learn by observing other people’s actions, however the payoff gets
discounted.  All else constant, as people get more patient,  * goes up, they will be more willing
to wait. Since waiting induces learning, one might be tempted to conclude that higher * would
be associated with a smaller probability of an inefficient negative cascade. However this is not
the case. 
(28)z
With a higher *, at the ongoing rate of information flow agents would strictly prefer to wait, 8
would be equal to zero. However as argued earlier, 8=0 cannot be sustained in equilibrium. So
the rate of information flow goes down. In other words, in equilibrium, people are just indifferent
between waiting and moving, hence a higher * induces a smaller rate of information flow. Since
V=V
H, a weaker information flow simply increasing the likelihood of a negative cascade due to
a weaker :
H. However at the same time the weaker information flow would increase the noise in
the learning process. And these two opposing effects cancel each other out since 8 cancels out
from the probability of inefficient cascade. Meanwhile, a higher * yields a higher upper bound
q
_
, leaving the starting point and the lower bound unchanged. This also makes the inefficient
negative cascade more likely.
On the other hand, the probability of an inefficient positive cascade goes down as * goes
up.
(29)za
A higher * induces a higher upper bound q
_
. The subjective probability that V=V
H must be higher
for a patient agent to prefer to invest now when she is to find out the true value of the project for
sure next period.  This makes the inefficient positive cascade less likely.
5.4. Quality of information:
In the exogenous-timing model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1996) as quality of
information goes up the likelihood of incorrect cascades unambiguously goes down. However in
our endogenous-timing framework the effect of signal quality on the probability of inefficient-17-
herding is not monotone. As the signal quality improves, the likelihood of inefficient cascades
may go up or down depending on the parameter values. (NELSON?, Decamps?)
A decrease in the signal quality (an increase in R) leads to a decrease in q0, leaving the
upper bound and the lower bound unchanged. An decrease in q0 increase the probability of a
positive cascade and decreases the probability of a negative cascade. Meanwhile, an increase in
R (decrease in signal quality) also affects the drift velocity and the power of the noise of the
stochastic learning process:
    and 





The effect of an increase in R on the probability of an inefficient negative cascade may be positive
or negative depending on the value  takes (See Appendix A3). Appendix A4
shows that the increase in R may result in an increase or in a decrease in the probability of an
inefficient positive cascade depending on the parameter values.12See Beatty and Ritter (1986).
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(32)zd
This suggest that the results on signal quality of the exogenous timing herding literature may not
be applicable to the endogenous timing herding. When the sequence of moves is endogenous
there are three forces to be studied; Higher quality information (smaller R) increases the chances
of efficient learning, and hence decreases the probability of an inefficient cascade. But as quality
of information goes up, the rate of information arrival goes down. This increases the probability
of an inefficient cascade. The third factor is the starting point. When R goes up, the starting point
qT=1 goes down. This makes the probability of a positive cascade go down and it makes the
probability of a negative cascade go up. Exactly which force overwhelms the other/s depends on
the parameter values of the problem. Examples?
6. Discussion
The comparative statics results from this endogenous timing herding model may be able to shed
some light on a variety of questions from different fields of economics. The parameters of the
model, the discount factor, the prior beliefs, the signal quality and the expected value of the
project can take different interpretations depending on the market under consideration.  
6.1. Initial Public Offerings
The IPO market is a fixed-price common-value good market where later potential investors can
observe the investment decisions of early investors. One of the puzzles in this market is the strong
documented underpricing 
12. And casual observation of the IPO market shows that offerings
occasionally fail because there is too low of a demand. Both these features are consistent with our
herding model of investment. A lower offering price increases the expected value to potential
investors. This model would predict that  a lower offering price would be associated with a lower
probability of a negative cascade where the offering fails. Welch (1992)  examines the price-19-
setting by an informed seller of an IPO where buyers cascade. When there is inside information,
Welch (1992) can explain why an optimally priced IPO might fail. This paper, however, predicts
positive probability of a negative cascade for any price the seller picks even when there is no
inside information.       
6.2. Financial versus Real Markets
While * simply represents the discount factor, it may also be regarded as capturing the time
required to process and react to information. Keeping the rate of time preference constant, as the
time to process information increases so does the distance between the time periods in the model,
leading to a lower *. In financial markets agents tend to attain and process information very
quickly. In real investment, however, there is often a non-negligible time gap between the
moment of a decision to undertake an investment project and the visibility of that decision. Hence
in financial markets the relevant * would be larger than in real markets. The paper suggests that
as * goes up the rate of information flow goes down and hence, the likelihood of an inefficient
collapse would be higher in markets with quick information dissemination and processing even
though one might be tempted to think that financial markets would have more information
efficiency. 
In a more fully developed model for the purposes, one could analyze the effect of liquidity
on the probability of inefficient collapses. The more liquid market might imply a higher * since
expected time to trade would be shorter.  Hence a financial market that is open to the world
markets and hence with higher liquidity might be more prone to inefficient collapse. This
possibility is often suggested in the discussion of hot money and exchange rate/debt crises and
the model presented here may be adaptable to give some meat to that discussion.
6.3. Speculative Attacks
The model may help to gain further understanding of the importance of the reputation of a
government pursuing a fixed exchange rate regime. Suppose that an agent invests in foreign
currency, the agent will have a low expected payoff if in reality the fundamentals of the economy
are bad. The agent will have a high expected payoff if in reality the fundamentals of the economy
are good. Each agent is aware of the potential speculative gains and has a one unit of domestic
currency for possible investment in the foreign exchange market. Agents can observe the amount-20-
of speculative purchases from the monetary authority each period.  The model would suggest that
it is possible that a speculative attack is staged even when economic fundamentals are good. The
possibility of such an inefficient cascade would decline however with the good reputation of the
government.    
6.4. Advertising, Warrantees and Buy-Back Options
This paper suggests that firms producing an identical high quality product will face different
chances of falling into a negative cascade depending on their reputation q*. While the firm with
a good reputation might have its product be purchased by masses, the firm with a lesser reputation
has a higher chance of not being able to take off.   This presents two questions to be further
investigated: In a market with social learning would firms be tempted to overinvest in reputation
possibly in advertising in order to avoid falling into a negative cascade? 
Another key variable in the analysis is the expected value of the project. Warranty and buy
back options are  important elements of marketing new products as better warranty and buy back
options signal higher product quality. Hence these options increase the  expected value from
investing in the product both directly and indirectly through signaling. This model suggests that
in markets where there is social learning these marketing tools will have even a bigger
significance. By offering warranty and buy back options, firms can increase the chances of
positive cascades where purchases of the product booms. All else equal, firms that do not offer
these options will have a relatively high probability of facing a collapse of purchases. 
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Appendix
Appendix A: 
Claim A1 :   
Proof: Define f(R)=R-1-lnR. Note that f(1)=0. Since
Y f(R)>0 for 0<R<1.  So, ~-22-
Claim A2: 
 Proof: 
Define f(R)=(1-R)(lnR-2)-2lnR. Note that f(1)=0. Since
Y f(R)>0 for 0<R<1 ~
Claim A3:    
Proof: Define f(R)=R-1-RlnR . Note that f(1)=0. Since f N(R)= 1-lnR-1=-lnR>0
Y f(R) <0 for 0<R<1. So  ~
Claim A4:   
Proof:  , so 
Define f(R)=2R-2-RlnR-lnR. Note that f(1)=0. Since
by A1. Hence f(R)>0. So  . ~
Appendix B: 
Claim B1:   or  depending on parameter values.
Proof: In equation (31), the first term on the right hand side is positive. ($+lnR)<0, for qT=1>0.
n is given by (xx).   by Appendix A1. Examining (xx), for 0<"<1, 0>($+lnR)>ln(1-*)>-
4. This condition is equivalent to q _<q0<q
_
 of the original problem. Taking the limit when
($+lnR)Y0,
  . 
Taking the limit when ln(1-*)Y- 4 first term of (???) goes to zero using the L’Hopital’s Rule,  
   For  -23-
This is also equivalent to, 
. ~
Claim B2:    or   depending on parameter values.
Proof: Examining (32), for 0<$<1, 0>(T+lnR)>ln(1-*)>-4. This condition is equivalent to q _ <
q0 < q
_
 of the original problem. Taking the limit when (T+lnR)Y0,
since  .
THE OTHER SIDE MISSING
Appendix C:
Lemma C1: Let  be a Wiener process with absorbing boundaries as defined in (*), (**),
(15), (16)  and with starting point  . Let  be another process with the same form
and parameters as wt up to some possibly stochastic time  at which time the parameter
is replaced by  which may also be stochastic. Both  and  yield the same probabilities
of hitting the boundaries which are given by * and **.
Proof: Define  as the joint p.d.f. of  and  conditional on not hitting either
boundary in  Define  as the probability starting from  that process hits the
boundry  before  Since  is a standard Wiener process  is given by 
(33)zp-24-
and   These depend on 8 only through the ratio   From (12) this
ratio is given by:
  (34)zq
Hence the probabilities of  hitting the boundaries do not depend on 8.  Although the date
as no special relevance to this process we can still decomposed this probability into the
probability that it transitions before or at  and the probability it transitions after   
  (35)zm
While we know the left-hand side of this, the formulas for the conditional probabilities and p.d.f.s
on the right-hand side are unknown. However, since  starts off as the same process we can
similarly decompose its probability as:
(36)zn
Here both the left and right-hand side probabilities are unknown. Nevertheless, since it is the
same process up to  these conditional probabilities and p.d.f.s are the same as in (35) with the
exception of the continuation probabilities in the integrals. Note however these are simply the
probabilities for the Wiener process starting from  with parameter  and hence for each
potential realization of   and  the probability can be found from (33) by substituting   for
As before  cancels out from these probabilities. Therefore each  in equation (36)
is equal to the corresponding   in (35) and hence  The same argument
shows that  which completes the proof of the lemma.
~-25-
Proposition C1: The equilibrium of the game with any finite set ' of possible contingency trigger
points with cardinality greater than one and which contains both  and  will yield the same
transition probabilities as the baseline model. 
Proof: From the baseline model where  add one contingency trigger point  If
 then the state  would never be reached in the baseline equilibrium and hence we
can construct a parallel equilibrium where no agent chooses to have a contingency triggered at
Hence the edition of  will not change the transition probabilities. 
If  then some agents may choose to set contingencies there. Let
henceforth  B, be the probability that an individual agent chooses to set a contingency
trigger at  This may be either to buy or to cancel an impending order. Note that  may depend
on t since for a given number of impending orders the time remaining in the period will determine
the rate of information flow which in tern influences the expected value of waiting. By the same
argument used for  it is straightforward to show that B<1.  If  is a buy trigger and B=1 then
each individual would prefer to wait since  If it is a wait trigger and B=1 then each
individual would prefer to buy since
So either the addition of  has no effect on the outcome in the period (B=0) or in
equilibrium each individual will be indifferent between using it as a trigger or not. 